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Kosel: Student Loans in Bankruptcy

ARTICLES
RUNNING THE GAUNTLET OF
"UNDUE HARDSHIP"-THE
DISCHARGE OF STUDENT
LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY
Janice E. Kosel*
The National Defense Education Act of 1958 established
the National Defense Student Loan Program. 1 National Defense
Student Loans (now known as National Direct Student Loans or
NDSL's) are funded through annual appropriations by Congress.
The funds are distributed to institutions of higher education
which agree to match every nine dollars of federal funds with
one dollar of their own.2 An institution may make loans only to
those students who demonstrate financial need.3 A student may
borrow up to $12,000 for undergraduate and graduate school,
but no more than $6,000 may be used for undergraduate studies." Repayment of NDSL's begins six months after the student
ends study at the institution and may take up to ten y:ears.1I
A second major governmental endeavor, the Federal Insured
Student Loan Program, was enacted as part of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and implemented by legislation in 1968 and
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. A.B., 1968, University of California,
Berkeley; J.D., 1971, University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall).
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 421-429 (1976). Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
§ 137(b), 86 Stat. 273, transferred current funding and other key provisions to the
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified in scattered
sections of '20 U.S.C.). Recent modifications of relevant NDSL statutes appear at 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 1087cc-1087dd (Supp. 1980).
2. 20 U.S.C.A. 1087cc(a)(2) (Supp. 1980).
3. ld. § 1087dd(b).
4. ld. § 1087dd(a)(2).
5. ld. § 1087dd(c)(1)(A).
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1969.6 Unlike NDSL's, Federal Insured Student Loans (known
as FISL's) are not funded by the federal government. Rather,
private lenders are encouraged to make student loans which are
guaranteed by the federal government. 7 Although a borrower
need not formally demonstrate financial need, he or she cannot
borrow more than the difference between educational costs and
other financial aid. 8 A student may borrow up to $25,000 for
graduate and undergraduate school, but no more than $12,500
may be for undergraduate studies.9 Repayment of FISL's also
begins six months after the student ends study at the institution
and may take up to ten years. 10
By 1972, Congress had become concerned with the default
rates on both NDSL's and FISL's. It perceived an abuse of the
programs when students sought to discharge all of their educational debts in bankruptcy shortly after graduation from college.
To remedy that supposed abuse, a proposal was made which ultimately was enacted as section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.11 Henceforth, such student loans would be dis6. ld. §§ 1071 to 1087-3a.
7. S. REP. No. 673, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 4027, 4061.
8. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1078(a)(2) (Supp. 1980).
9. ld. § 1075(a)(2).
10. ld. § 1077(a)(2)(B).
11. Section 4-506(a)(8) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act provided that an educational debt could not be discharged in bankruptcy if "the first payment of any installment thereof was due on a date less than five years prior to the date of the petition and
if its payment from future income or other wealth will not impose an undue hardship on
the debtor and his dependents." COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMM.
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMlT1'ING A REPORT OF THE BANKRUPTCY COMM. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137,93d
Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II, at 140 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY
COMMISSION]. While the proposed Bankruptcy Act continued to undergo revision, the
essence of that section was enacted as section 439A of the Higher Education Act of 1975,
effective Oct. 1, 1977. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976).
Section 439A of the Higher Education Act was repealed as of the date of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Nov. 6, 1978. The effective date of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act was Oct. 1, 1979. For an eleven-month period between the date of enactment
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on Nov. 6, 1978 and its effective date on Oct. 1, 1979,
there would be no federal statute providing for the nondischargeability of student loans.
To remedy this inadvertant gap, a new section was added to the Bankruptcy Code by
Act of Aug. 14, 1979, providing for the nondischargeability of student loans for a period
of five years after they become due absent a showing of undue hardship. Pub. L. No. 9656, 43 Stat. 387 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979». For a discussion of
the dischargeability of student loans between Nov. 6, 1978 and Aug. 1979, see Georgia
Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. V. Broughton, 6 Bankr. Rep. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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chargeable in bankruptcy only if "such loan first became due
before five years. . . before the date of the filing of the petition;
or . . . excepting such debt from discharge . . . will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents
"12

This Article will first examine the legislative history of that
provision and then review the case law implementing and interpreting the undue hardship exception. IS It is the author's thesis
that the absence of a single coherent legislative theory for the
nondischargeability of student loans has inevitably led to a number of disparate judicial interpretations.
Regardless of the underlying rationale, a survey of the case
law indicates that the courts have interpreted the undue hardship exception quite stringently. Generally, they have discharged
student loans only if the debtor can scarcely maintain a minimal
lifestyle after prudent allocation of income and employment effort. Even this hard line approach ignores the undue hardship
exception already built into the student loan program-the ability of the administrator to grant unlimited forbearance in the
event of financial distress.1-' In light of this second undue hardship exception, it is difficult to envision any circumstances in
which a student loan should be discharged. Yet a number of discharges have been granted.
Legislative revision of section 523(a)(8) is essential, not simply to give a consistent meaning to that provision, but to ensure
12. 11 u.s.c. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. ill 1979).
13. A number of sanctions have been imposed on the student loan debtor who files
bankruptcy that are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Comment, Skipping Out
on Alma MateI': Some Problems Involving the Collection of Federal Student Loans, 15
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 317 (1980) (denial of transcripts, additional student aid, enrollment at former institution, and admission to the bar); Comment, A Fresh Start
through Bankruptcy: Fact or Frustration for the Student Loan Debtor, 2 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 365 (1979) (denial of transcript); In re Wave, 9 Bankr. Rep. 24 (W.D. Mo.
1981) (denial of transcript is an illegal collection effort under section 362(a)(1) of the
new Bankruptcy Code); Application of Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979) (upholding
denial of admission to the bar not because of the bankruptcy filing but on the basis of
the applicant's moral character as reflected in his lack of financial responsibility and his
default on the student loans prior to the filing); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d
1267 (8th Cir. 1977) (private school's refusal to issue a transcript because of failure to
pay student loans discharged in bankruptcy is a legal means of inducing debtor to make
payment under the Bankruptcy Act).
. 14. 20 U.S.C. § 1080(c) (1976).
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the fulfillment of a societal goal greater than the bankruptcy objective of a fresh start for the individual debtor-namely, the
maintenance of educational loan programs for future generations
of students. In order to facilitate that objective, student loans
should be nondischargeable in bankruptcy regardless of the
debtor's circumstances.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 523(a)(8)
OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 does not clearly refer to the rationale underlying the enactment of section 523(a)(8), but the Senate Report does indicate
an intent to follow prior law.1Is Turning then to its predecessor,
the purpose of section 439(A) of the Higher Education Act of
197516 was explained as follows:
The amendment was adopted in the light of testimony that the bankruptcy rate involving student
loans has increased significantly in the last several
years and that in some areas of the country students are being counseled on filing for bankruptcy
to discharge their obligations to repay guaranteed
student loans.
The Committee notes that in most circumstances a student may leave school with several
thousand dollars in student loans and no assets,
thereby making the student technically eligible to
declare bankruptcy. The amendment, by waiting
five years, would offer a more re~tic view on the
student's ability to repay a student loan. 17

Thus, the articulated purpose of this legislation was to prevent a specific abuse, the filing of bankruptcy shortly after graduation for the primary purpose of discharging student loans.
Proponents of the legislation produced statistics compiled by
the Office of Education showing a rapid and dramatic increase in
the incidence ot student loan bankruptcies. IS As one member of
Congress noted: "I feel certain that a problem has been identi15. "[It] follows generally current law and excerpts [sic] from discharge stuaent
loans until such loans have been due and owing for five years." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865.
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13.-14 (1976).
18. The statistics demonstrate the rise in student loan bankruptcies.

{

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss2/1

4

Kosel: Student Loans in Bankruptcy

1981]

STUDENT LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY

461

tied, a problem of serious proportions and consequence, but one
which has not yet reached catastrophic or crippling magnitude.
Now is the time to act to prevent it from becoming so. "19
The Congressman's fears for the future were based on two
factors. Increasing numbers of students had taken out loans over
the past decade so that the total dollar impact on the student
loan program of even a constant rate of bankruptcy filings would
increase dramatically.20 Moreover, in all likelihood the incidence
of student loan bankruptcy filing would continue its geometric
ascent. The moral stigma attached to bankruptcy was apparently on the decline. And the incidence of bankruptcy in federally administered student loan programs was not yet as high as
that in state-run programs "due in large part to the lack of pursuit of defaulters. When the pressure to meet obligations begins
to be applied in the Federal programs, I think it is safe to predict a dramatic rise in bankruptcy filings in that program
alsO."21

In reference to statistics marshaled by the Office of Ed~ca
tion, the Congressman confidently stated that "this is clear evidence of improper use of the Federal bankruptcy law with reSTUDENT LOAN BANKRUPTCIES
Fiscal Year
1966-1970
1972
1974
1975

Fiscal
Year

Number of Claims

Dollar Amount

348
1342
2914
4559

.4 million
1.6 million
3.8 million
6.8 million

Percentage Increase
of Personal Bankruptcies

Percentage Increase of Student
Loan Bankruptcies

29.2
1973-1974
8.4
59.9
32.9
1974-1975
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1072-73 (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.) and 1095 (statement of Sheldon Steinbach) (Jan. 29, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
19. Id. at 1091 (testimony of Representative John N. Erlenboro).
20. Id. at 1095 (statement of Sheldon Steinbach). Annual expenditures for NDSL's
had increased from 40 million in fiscal year 1960 to 345 million in fiscal year 1975. Annual expenditures for FISL's had increased from 29 million in fiscal year 1968 to 334
million in fiscal year 1975. American Statistical Index, Digest of Education Statistics,
4564-1, at 172 (1979).
21. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1088 (statement of Representative John N.
Erlenborn).
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spect to the discharge of Federally guaranteed student loans. "22
Others were not so easily convinced. Indeed, the legislative history is replete with statistics justifying their skepticism. Focusing solely on percentage increases in bankruptcy filings had led
to a misconception of the nature and extent of the current problem. Although $17 million had been paid on guaranteed student
loan bankruptcy claims during fiscal years 1969-1975, over $7
billion had been loaned during that period.28 Only two-tenths of
one percent of the loans made, involving less than three-tenths
of one percent of the dollars loaned, had been discharged in
bankruptcy.24 As one bankruptcy judge concluded, "bankruptcy
losses do not appear to present any great threat to the [student
loan] program."25
Indeed, the type of bankruptcy abuse specifically contemplated by Congress was virtually nonexistent. Less than one student borrower in two hundred had declared bankruptcy.26 The
specific abuse Congress sought to prevent could be inferred only
from that small fraction of these bankruptcy filings where educationalloans were the predominant debt. 27 In sum, apart from
a few well publicized horror stories,28 there was little evidence to
suggest that the overwhelming majority of student loan bankruptcies were anything but legitimate.
No data exists describing the situation of those
declaring bankruptcy. How many of those former
students completed their education and received
their degrees? How many were employed when
22. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 157 (1977).
23. Hearings, supra note 18, at 981 (statement of Clive W. Bare) (Dec. 10, 1975).
24. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 161 (1977).
25. Hearings, supra note 18, at 981 (statement of Clive W. Bare) (Dec. 10, 1975).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1976).
27. A survey conducted by the General Accounting Office indicated that in approximately 20% of the bankruptcy cases involving guaranteed student loans, over 80% of the
debtor's total indebtedness was attributable to educational loans. H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977). A random sample analyzed by the Comptroller General
of student loan borrowers who petitioned for bankruptcy indicated that educational
debts averaged only $4,138 of $14,115 total unsecured debts-less than 30%. Id. at 139.
Only 35% of student loan borrrowers who petitioned for bankruptcy scheduled educational debts accounting for 60% or more of theirnonpriority unsecured debts. Id. at 144.
28. The classic example was a Stanford University student who secured student
loans in order to obtain an undergraduate degree in business, a master's degree in engineering, and a law degree. Two weeks after leaving school he filed a bankruptcy petitioIl;
listing a total indebtedness of $17,275-all in student loans. Hearings, supra note 18, at
1073-74 (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.).
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they filed for bankruptcy, and for how long? How
many felt obligated to take out student loans they
didn't originally want, or in amounts greater than
thoughtful credit counseling would have advised?
How many found work, but in occupations far removed in form and earning power from their
mortgaged educational careers?29

Opposition to the nondischargeability provision was widespread. 30 One critic denounced the proposal to alter the dischargeability of student loans as "a discriminatory remedy for a
'scandal' which exists primarily in the imagination. "31 Another
condemned the proposal as "a serious allegation against a whole
generation."32 "Treating students, all students, as though they
were suspected frauds and felons is no substitute for improving
the administration of the program. "33
The exception to discharge for student loans was viewed by
critics as contrary to one of the most basic principles of bankruptcy law-equality of treatment for all debts and c~editors.
[I]t treats educational loans precisely as the law
now treats loans incurred by fraud, felony, and alimony dodging. No other legitimately contracted
consumer loan, applied to a legitimate undertakin [sic], is SUbjected to the assumption of
criminality which this provision applies to every
educational loan. . . . [I]t is a direct, unmitigated, slap in the face of every single student borrower in the nation. It assumes that borrower's
bad intentions, and deprives him of a right that
every other citizen has available to him if he
29. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 161 (1977).
30. Among the opponents were the House Judiciary Committee, American Bankers
Association, Consumer Bankers Association and National Student Lobby. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 132-33 (1977).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1976) (statement of Representative
James G. O'Hara).
32. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1096 (testimony of Sheldon Steinbach, comment by
Representative Don Edwards).
33. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1976) (statement of Representative
James G. O'Hara). Debts procured by fraud and criminal penalties are nondischargeable.
11 U.S.C. §§ 523 (a)(2) (A), 523(a)(7). Relatively few cases have analyzed educational
loans as debts obtained through false pretenses. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mwongozi, 4 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. 120 (D. Ore. 1978) (decided under former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17(a)(2) [11
U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976)]).
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needs it. S4
Proponents responded that educational loans are in fact different from most loans, and therefore merit special treatment.
Conventional loans typically are made on the basis of a financial
analysis of the borrower, his or her assets, and present income.
Conventional lenders frequently require security or a cosigner to
guarantee repayment of the debt. In contrast, student borrowers
rarely have present income or property and their educational
loans are neither cosigned nor secured. In a sense, student loans
represent a mortgage on the debtor's future because they are
based on the supposition that the loan will be paid from future
earnings attributable to the debtor's. education. Although secured debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy, the debtor must
forfeit the collateral; in order to keep the property, the debtor
must reaffirm the debt. 35 Because student loan debtors cannot
surrender an intangible asset like an education, they have no
choice; they must commit future earnings to the repayment of
student loans.
Moreover, proponents argued, nondischargeability of particular types of debts in bankruptcy was not without precedent.
For example, taxes are not dischargeable until three years after
they first become due. 36 One commentator has written that the
philosophical basis for the exception to discharge for taxes is the
high moral claim of the government as the representative of the
public. 3 '1 That policy applied equally well to student loans.
"When something is wrong with or threatens the Federally Insured and Guaranteed Student Loan Programs, immediate and
thoughtful attention must be given lest we run the risk of losing
or impairing the efficiency of key engredients in our system of
financing higher education."38 Later, a court would more clearly
articulate the political and practical objectives behind the
nondischargeability of student loans-" 'the preservation of a
program that benefits many thousands of borrowers which, if
eliminated, would leave students with virtually no institutional
34. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976) (emphasis in original).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 722 (Supp. n 1978).
36. Id. § 523(a)(1).
37. 1 D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 242 (2d ed. 1978).
38. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1087 (statement of Representative John N.
Erlenborn).
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source of borrowable funds.' "89
In the end, of course, the proponents of the amendment
prevailed. Congress voted to make student loans nondischargeable until five years had elapsed from the date the educational
loan first became due. The five year moratorium was apparently
selected on the basis of both factual and equitable considerations. Statistics indicated that the average time which elapsed
between the last student loan and the bankruptcy filings ranged
between thirty months"'o and forty-one mon~.41 Moreover,
bankruptcies occuring after the five year period did not have the
same indicia of abuse. If payment were not made within that
time period, it was more likely that the educational loan had not
.materially contributed to the increased income stream; because
the promise of higher education was unfulfilled, it seemed more
appropriate to forgive the debt.
In effect, the moratorium was intended to operate as a presumption that any bankruptcy filed within five years was done
with the primary purpose of discharging a student loan. No provision was made for the direct rebuttal of that presumption of
abuse. Instead, in order to alleviate the concern that the amendment would unduly impair the traditional goal of bankruptcy-a
fresh start for the debtor-provision was made for the discharge ability of student loans if "undue hardship on the debtor
and his dependents would otherwise result."

The undue hardship exception was clearly a compromise
measure. It provoked little comment in the legislative history.
Reflecting on the diverse concerns expressed by his colleagues,
one member of Congress voiced the belief that "this provision
. . . will enable referees to distinguish between individuals who
have contrived to secure an unjust enrichment through the operation of the bankruptcy law and those who have realistically
39. In re Payton, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,073 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 1978). In
Payton, the court rejected the argument that the provision for nondischargeability of
student loans violated the equal protection clause because it was rationally related to the
achievement of that legitimate governmental purpose.
40. This figure was derived from a June 1975 random survey of guaranteed student
,
loan bankruptcies under the New Jersey State Guarantee Loan Program. Hearings,
supra note 18, at 1074 (statement of Edward T. York, Jr.).
41. This figure was derived from an analysis of student loan bankruptcies conducted
by the Comptroller General. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 142 (1977).
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fallen on hard times and who deserve the benefits of the general
'fresh start' policy of the act."42 Of necessity, .that distinction
has been made, but in a different manner by each bankruptcy
judge who has confronted the issue. For, as the court noted in
Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation v. Bell,4s
"the legislative history is . . . of little assistance in determining
the underlying rationale of the exception to discharge for the
purpose of applying it to facts clearly within its scope.""
f'

II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "UNDUE
HARDSHIP"

A.

DISPARATE CRITERIA FOR THE DISCHARGE OF STUDENT LOANS

Extraordinary Hardship
Focusing on the word "undue," the courts have consistently
required a showing of economic difficulty that is not common to
all recent graduates.41i Repayment of student loans almost always imposes an immediate hardship on the debtor. The debts
of recent graduates generally vastly outnumber their assets. Yet
a simple comparison of assets and liabilities is misleading, for it
ignores a prime factor, earning power. Over time, an increased
earning capacity will normally be generated to alleviate that
temporary hardship. If the former student has secured employ42. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1095 (statement of Sheldon Steinbach).
43. 5 Bankr. Rep. 461 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
44. [d. at 462. One commentatof has attempted to fathom the legislative rationale
and thereby provide guidance for the implementation of the undue hardship exception.
Ahart, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201 (1978).
45. See, e.g., Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Packer, 9 Bankr. Rep.
884 (D. Mass. 1981); Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Bell, 5 Bankr. Rep. 461,
463 (N.D. Ga. 1980); New York State Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Brock, 4 Bankr.
Rep. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); New York State Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Kohn,
5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). These cases are consistent with the legislative
history. "That which affects the group generally is not considered an undue hardship."
Hearings, supra note 18, at 1092-93 (statement of Representative John N. Erlenbom).
Under § 4-506(a)(8) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act, the burden was on the creditor
to show that denial of discharge would not impose an undue hardship on the debtor.
REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY COMM., supra note 11, at 136 (1973). However, the legislative history indicates that the provision as enacted in § 523(a)(8) was intended to be selfexecuting; that is, the creditor is not required to file a complaint to determine nondischargeability of a student loan. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865. But see University of Alabama v.
Wright, 7 Bankr. Rep. 197, 200 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (emphasis in original), suggesting "that

the burden is on the creditor to show that the loan first be~ame due before five years,
before the date of filing the bankruptcy petition. Otherwise the loan is presumed
discharged."
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ment in the field of endeavor for which he or she is trained and
there is a reasonable probability that income will increase in the
future, present hardship is neither unique nor unexpected. Confronted by this situation in Bell, the court noted that "[w]hile
the debtor's budget will undoubtedly be tight for the foreseeable
future, that is a common rather than an undue hardship."46 If
there are no factors which indicate that the bankrupt's plight
differs from the great majority of student loan debtors, the undue hardship discharge will be denied.

Self-Imposed Hardship-Maintenance of a Minimal Lifestyle
In other cases, while the debtor's economic straits may be
more severe than those of most student loan debtors, that situation is due to circumstances well within the debtor's control. Future repayment difficulties may have been engendered by voluntary reaffirmation of 'debt,4'1 unwise purchases,48 other
improvident expenditures,49 or even laziness and obesity.50 If the
46. Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Bell, 5 Bankr. Rep. 461, 463 (N.D. Ala.
1980).
47. See, e.g., In re Hayes, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,065 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 1979)

(debtor reaffirmed a debt secured by a second car; monthly payments on the car were
$118 while the minimum payment on federally insured student loans would be approximately $53 per month), and Vermont Student Assistance Corp. v. Ewell, 1 Bankr. Rep.
311, 313 (D. Vt. 1979) (debtor reaffirmed a debt of $3,750 to a credit union holding a
security interest in a car worth $1,000 because his wife was fond of the vehicle and

wanted to retain it).
48. See, e.g., Hayman v. Wilmington Trust Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 932 (S.D. Fla.
1978) (debtor incurred monthly payments of $88 on a car purchased after filing
bankruptcy).
49. See, e.g., Price v. United States, 1 Bankr. Rep. 768, 769 (D. Haw. 1980) (debtor
sent her three children to private school at a tuition of $2,700 per year); In re De Angelis, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,082 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1979) (the fact that the debtor's
rental expenses absorbed a substantial portion of her monthly income because she preferred "the advantages of a better neighborhood over a more budget-conscious lodging"
was not taken into account in determining hardship); In re Townsend, BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 11 67,140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1978) (debtor made contributions to various churches
of $75-100 monthly while the state would agree to accept monthly payments of only $1020 on the student loans).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Conard, 6 Bankr. Rep. 151, 152 (W.D. Ky. 1980).
Debtor described himself as "overweight" and testified that his physical appearance
"turns off a lot of people." The court denied a hardship discharge, noting that
corpulence is a condition which may swiftly diminish with
continued impecuniosity.
Enlightened self-interest would seem to suggest the virtue
of a vigorous and energetic search for a proper workshop in
which to use those intellectual tools which have been well
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debtor had exercised greater prudence, the money for the repayment of student loans would have been available. When confronted by debtor extravagance, the courts have consistently denied the undue hardship discharge. Their rationale was clearly
stated by the court in Hayman v. Wilmington Trust Company..61
"The discretion given this court to permit discharge during
those first five years to prevent 'undue hardship on the debtor
and his' dependents' is not intended to shelter the bankrupt
from self-imposed hardship from a reluctance to live within his
means."52 Or, as the court rather bluntly noted in Vermont Student Assistance Corporation v. Ewell,53
[t]he process of rehabilitation entails the exercise
of prudence on the part of the debtor. He must
not cast caution to the winds. Unfortunately, the
bankrupt failed to take heed. . . . [T]he money
required to payoff ... [the car] could have very
well been used in the future to payoff part of the
student loan. This in itself would tend to deprive
him of the protection of "undue hardship".M

Although phrased somewhat moralistically, the position adopted
by the courts appears to coincide with the legislative intent to
discharge student loans only in exceptional circumstances. Modest inconvenience occasioned by personal lifestyle choices is not
undue hardship. Discharging student loans in such circumstances would reward extravagance and penalize frugality.
In all other cases of alleged undue hardship, the consensus
of the courts has broken down, precisely because of the ambiguhoned at federal expense. Productivity is preferable to living
off the substance of the land.

Id. at 153.
In Virginia Educ. Loan Auth. v. Archie, 7 Bankr. Rep. 715 (E.D. Va., 1980), the
debtor left school prior to receiving a degree because she was depressed and had a very
low self-esteem due to an obesity problem. She had a surplus of income over expenses of
$37.13, even though she had extraordinarily high telephone bills and clothing expenses,
and planned to expend funds on a weight reduction program. The court denied the undue hardship discharge, seeing no reason why under careful budgeting the debtor would
not be able to repay the student loans. Id. at 718-19.
51. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 932 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
52. Id. at 933. The debtor had a total indebtedness of $3,957. Student loans comprise $2,600 of this total. I d. at 932.
53. 1 Bankr. Rep. 311 (D. Vt. 1979).
54. Id. at 313. The debtor scheduled student loans of $8,400 and other debts of
$4,650, including an obligation of $3,750 which he reaffirmed. Id. at 312-13.
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ity of the legislative history. As one judge noted:
It is regrettable that Congress shed so inadequate a spotlight on the exculpating phrase "undue hardship". What can be gleaned is that the
hardship is to be found in the exceptional case
and must be based on something more than inability to pay. It is also regrettable that so much
is therefore left to the individual view of each
judge who, after all, brings the sum of who and
what he was, who he has become, and what he
sees through his own eyes to this basically disagreeable task. 1I1I

A majority of courts generally have been sympathetic in
finding undue hardship to exist where. unexpected difficulties
triggered the debtor's financial problems. In so doing, they have
relied to a great extent on the absence of the specific abuse highlighted in the legislative history. Moreover, as one member of
Congress pointedly observed: "This requirement recognizes that
in some circumstances the debtor, because of factors beyond his
reasonable control, may be unable to earn an income adequate
both to meet the living costs of himself and his dependents and
to make the educational debt payments."116
The present and potential hardship, however, must be of
exceptional degree to conform to the guidelines articulated in a
communique from the Bankruptcy Commission.
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will impose an undue
hardship on the debtor, the rate and amount of
his future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to obtain, retain, and continue employment and the rate of pay that can be
expected. Any unearned income or other wealth
which the debtor can be expected to receive
should be taken into account. The total amount
of income, its reliability, and the periodicity of its
receipt should be adequate to maintain the debtor
and his dependents, at a minimal standard of living within their management capability as well as
55. New York Higher Educ. Servo v. White, 6 Bankr. Rep. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(citation omitted).
56. REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY COMM., supra note 11, at 140.
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debt.~7

Unforeseen Circumstances
Most courts have applied the standard of the Bankruptcy
Commission quite stringently, focusing on the nature of the
scheduled debts and the circumstances that led to the filing of
the petition, as well as the debtor's prospective ability to maintain a "minimal" standard of living following the discharge of
other debts in bankruptcy. Thus, an undue hardship discharge
was granted to student loan debtors in the following rather
classical hardship circumstances:
-The debtor's wife had contracted a rare disease which
had generated major medical bills and had made impossible
her present, and perhaps future, employment. The debtor's
take home pay was less than the family needed for living
expenses. He had no real or personal property of any consequence. The court determined that the existence of medical
problems coupled with the lack of income constituted
grounds for a finding of undue hardship, noting that there
was no apparent abuse of the bankruptcy system and that
the debtor had clear need for a fresh start.~8
-The debtor was diabetic and had no equity in his household furnishings or his auto. He was paying child support
for the child of his first marriage and was in the midst of a
divorce from his second wife. Although there was no evidence of extravagant living, the debtor was unable to keep
current with his bills on his present income and had little
prospect of increased income in the future. Educational
loans constituted only fifteen to twenty percent of his total
indebtedness. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that requiring the debtor to repay the student loans
would impose upon him an undue hardship. ~9
-The debtor and her husband maintained a standard of
living near the welfare level. She had recently terminated
her employment due to pregnancy. She and her husband
were unable to pay monthly expenses, much less the ex57. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1097 (testimony of Sheldon Steinbach quoting the
Bankruptcy Commission Report) (emphasis added).
58. In re Valentine, BANKR. L. REp. (CCH) 11 67,042 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 1979).
59. In re Bonnington, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,009 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 1978).
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isting medical bills they were obligated to pay as post-petition debts, and the future medical bills they would likely
incur for their child who suffered from a respiratory problem. The court discharged a student loan of approximately
$2,200. 60
-The debtor was the divorced, forty-five-year-old mother
of four children, two of whom lived at home. She did not
receive a college degree. She had suffered a series of illnesses, including heart trouble and alcoholism, and needed
surgery. When the debtor was employed, she could work
only half a day because of her health problems. She was
spending more per week than her income. Characterizing
the situation as a "classic hardship case," the court discharged the student loan.61
-The debtor was a third generation depressive. At the
time of the hearing, she was living on unemployment insurance which was scheduled to run out in a month or two.
Although her future was bleak, the court chose to focus on
the present. ~'Not being clairvoyant, the Court can only
base its decision upon what has happened in the past and
what was happening at or about the time of the hearing..
Certainly, at this point in time, it would work an undue
hardship on the bankrupt to pay the plaintiff. "62
-The debtor completed only one semester of college and
had not worked in the three years since she dropped out of
school. She was a welfare recipient, pregnant, and in the
midst of a divorce. She lived at home with her parents and
planned to move out. She was partially disabled for an uncertain duration from an automobile accident. The court
discharged her $1,500 student loan. It represented less than
thirty percent of her total unsecured debts. 6s
60. Connecticut Student Loan Foundation, Inc. v. Bagley, 4 Bankr. Rep. 248 (D.
Ariz. 1980).
61. Diaz v. New York Higher Educ. Servo Corp., 5 Bank. Rep. 253, 253·54 (W.D.N.Y.

1980).
62. New York State Higher Educ. Servo Corp. v. Barrington, 7 Bankr. Rep. 267, 268
(W.D.N.Y. 1980).
63. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532
(E.D. Pa. 1979).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1

472

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll:457

Failure of the Promise of Education-Increased Earning
Capacity
Although they might not have disagreed with the results in
each of the classic cases above, other courts have cautioned that
honest debtors who suffer extreme misfortune due to circumstances beyond their control do not automatically present cases
of undue hardship. In so doing, they have followed the admonition of one member of Congress who noted that in such circumstances further inquiry should be undertaken. 64
If, after graduating from school, an individual becomes a paraplegic and earning capacity was impaired, there might be a finding of hardship. If
the individual has had his or her earning capacity
improved by virtue of the loan and other factors
are not present, I don't think a hardship would
exist.6~

The Congressman's comment reiterates the argument that
student loans represent a claim of the government on the future
earnings of the debtor, somewhat in the nature of a security interest. The implicit promise of education is an increased earning
capacity. If that promise is unfulfilled, the "collateral" is economically valueless and the student loan debtor should be free
to discharge the debt. But if the debtor is employed in a job
related to his or her educational training, on a quantum meruit
theory discharge should be denied regardless of the presence of
unforeseen circumstances or the absence of any indicia of abuse.
The court accepted this view in In re Garcia66 where the
debtor had recently lost a child and the resulting medical expenses were the primary reason for his bankruptcy filing.
Debtor's assets consisted of household furniture and a car. His
monthly living expenses consumed all but twenty-five dollars of
his net income. Nonetheless, the court was unwilling to grant a
harCiship discharge, noting that the debtor was employed as an
internal revenue agent and was "young, intelligent, and
healthy."67 Unforeseen circumstances had not impaired his abil64. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1092-93 (testimony of Representative John N.
Erlenborn).
65.Id.
66. 1 Bankr. Rep. 253 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
67. [d. at 254.
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ity to repay the student loan because they had not negated his
earning capacity.
I

Even in the absence of actual employment in a field related
to one's education, a 'potential for such employment, however
remote, may negate the finding of undue hardship. For example,
the court in New York State Higher Education Services Corporation v. Henry denied the discharge of $4,500 in student loans
to a debtor who had received a masters degree in social work."
She was unemployed and lived with her brother and his family.
The debtor was unsuccessful in obtaining a job, even though she
had applied for fifty positions in the social work "area. The court
pointedly observed that "her potential for future gainful employment is far from bleak. . . [T]here are hundreds of organizations in New York City which have positions in her field to
which she has not applied, and she apparently has made no effort to seek employment outside her chosen field. "69 •
In many instances, however, the promise of education has
not been fulfilled. Increased earnings in the chosen field were
not forthcoming. In such circumstances, most courts will grant a
hardship discharge, provided the debtor maintains the ~imal
lifestyle envisioned in the report of the Bankruptcy Commission. 70 For example:
-Although the debtor had a degree in social work, she was
unable to hold a regular job. What she could hope to earn
would be minimal at best. She had no property. Noting the
lifestyle standard suggested in the report of the Bankruptcy
CODmllssion, the court found the requisite undue hardship
and discharged the student loan.71
-The debtor had spent five years in college but had received no degree. He had no assets and his net income as a
part-time truck driver was expended as soon as it came in.
Noting that the debtor's "education was valueless in ap68. 4 Bankr. Rep. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
69. Id. at 497-98. In part, the harshness of the opinion may be explained by the
timing of the bankruptcy petition-two months after the student loan became due. See
the discussion of Littel in the text accompanying notes 84-87 infra for a more sympa:'
thetic approach when employment in the chosen field is unrealistic.
70. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
71. In re Matthews, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,049 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 1979).
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praising his future income," the court discharged the student loan. 72
-The debtor enrolled in a number of accounting courses,
but his education did not improve his position in his employment as a policeman. It did not appear that his earning
capacity in the foreseeable future would be enhanced to any
extent because of the educational value of the courses. Mter bankruptcy, the debtor's financial resources were insufficient to support him and his dependents at a break-even
level. Again, the student loan was discharged. 73
-The debtor was a CETA employee who had never completed college. She and her children resided with her family. In dictum, the court stated that the debtor had no present ability to make payments and noted that "[o]nly by
divining a rosy future unsupported by known facts could
the plaintiff argue any ability to repay this loan in the future."7. Because the loan was a direct loan rather than a
federally insured or guaranteed loan, it was unnecessary to
make a hardship determination. If it were necessary, the
outcome is clear.75
-The debtor was a certified teacher but her efforts to obtain a job in her field had been 'futile. Since receiving her
certification, she had held a number of dead-end jobs, ultimately working as a substitute teacher. The court took into
account her efforts to obtain work, the job obtained, her
present level of employment, and her current level of income, which was unable to sustain her above the poverty
level. The court determined that she had little chance in
the near future of obtaining a full-time teaching job which
would significantly alter her present circumstances. "[I]f
the past is any guide to the future, the bankrupt's prospects
are far from rosy."76 The court clearly articulated its interpretation of the legislative purpose behind the nondis72. In re Gangloff, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,007 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1978).
73. In re Fonzo, 1 Bankr. Rep. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
74. Daemen College v. Thomas, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 796, 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
75. Id. at 796, 797.
76. New York Higher Educ. Servo Corp. v. Moore, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 791, 792
(W.D.N.Y. 1978). Even though the debtor had a $30 miscellaneous item in her budget,
U[s]he [had] stretched her budget by not eating, not replacing clothes and doing without
many of the necessities of life"; therefore, the student loan was discharged. Id.
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chargeability of student loans.
In essence, Congress is saying to the Bankruptcy
Courts that they are Courts of Equity and if they
are satisfied that the repayment of student loans
within the purview of the statute would work an
inappropriate, inequitable burden upon the bankrupt or their [sic] dependents then a discharge
should be granted.77

In each of these cases, the debtor maintained a very minimal lifestyle. If the debtor had been able to maintain a more
moderate lifestyle,' albeit unenhanced by the mortgaged education, the student loans may not have been discharged.
The Government's High Moral Claim
The legislative history indicates that the government is a
special creditor with a high moral claim to repayment.78 Thus,
even in the absence of benefit, courts may deny the discharge of
stp.dent loans if there is a capacity for repayment. For example:
-The debtor was dismissed from school after four years of
college work in marketing and sales for failure to meet minimum academic requirements. At the time of trial, he was
employed in a factory job. Although he had no wealth, the
court noted that the debtor was "able bodied with no medical problems, no dependents and no excessive living expenses. "79 The court denied the hardship discharge because
the debtor maintained more than a minimal lifestyle, even
•
though his job was unrelated to his education.
-The debtor was employed as a spot welder on an assembly line. Her former husband had left the country and refused to support the children, one of whom had a brain tumor which required an elaborate operation. There was a
substantial possibility that if additional treatment were required for her son, the debtor would be unable to continue
her full-time employment. The court noted that she had
proposed "an extremely tight but not unreasonable budget
77. ld.
78. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
79. Ohio v. Kirch, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 680, 682 (S.D. Ohio 1978). The debtor budgeted
only $205-$85 for rent and $120 for food.
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which appears to account for most normal expenditures."8o
Nonetheless, the court denied the discharge, finding that
payment by defeJ,Ted installments of twenty-five dollars per
month, almost one-half of the unbudgeted income, "might
be within the debtor's future economic abilities."81
-The debtor was educated in the area of urban studies.
She was thirty years old, healthy, and working part-time.
The court noted that she "could keep life and limb together
for herself and her daughter while not living opulently."82
The court denied the hardship discharge, observing that
"[i]t is no answer that the bankrupt is not presently employed in her chosen area. "8S The rationale of the court is
abundantly clear, for in a footnote', it quoted from the
statement of a Congressman in the legislative history:
" '[W]hile I sympathize with . . . the many students who
are unable to find employment which they believe to be
commensurate with their level of education, I do not believe
that this gives them a license to steal.' "tw

B.

THE MULTIFACETED TEST-"RUNNING THE GAUNTLET"

The cases reflect four primary considerations in a decision
to discharge a student loan: [1] a minimal lifestyle, [2] unforeseen circumstances, [3] a job unrelated to the debtor's studies,
and [4]" the special status of the governmerit as creditor. The
legislative history lends support to each theory of dischargeability, but it fails to rank them in order of priority. As a result,
bankruptcy courts generally have been unable to agree on the
relative importance of each of these factors. For the most part,
the courts have adopted an ad hoc approach, applying whatever
test seemed to be appropriate to the circumstances. From the
cases, only the following generalizations can be gleaned:
[1] The undue hardship discharge will be denied if the

debtor can make the scheduled repayments and still
maintain a minimal lifestyle-regardless of the source
80. Wisconsin Higher Educ. Aida Bd. v. MacPherson, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 950, 951
(W.D. Wis. 1978).
81. Id.
82. New York Higher Educ. Servo Corp. V. White, 6 Bankr. Rep. 26, 28 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 28 n.5.
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of income.
[2] The undue hardship discharge will be denied if the
debtor could make the scheduled repayments and still
maintain a minimal lifestyle with a more prudent allocation of income or effort to seek employment.
[3] The undue hardship discharge will be granted if the
debtor can maintain only a minimal lifestyle and there
is no indicia of bankruptcy abuse-that is, if the
financial problems are due to circumstances beyond the
debtor's control and/or the debtor plainly received no
economic benefit from his or her education.
In Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v.
Johnson,s5 the court attempted to bring a semblance of order to
the diverse interpretations of the undue hardship exception by
formulating a multifaceted test that reflected the concerns expressed in the legislative history. The Johnson court's standards
are remarkably in line with the above generalizations. In order
to obtain an undue hardship discharge, the student loan debtor
must run a gauntlet by passing [1] a "mechanical" test (minimal
lifestyle), [2] a "good faith" test (prudent allocation of income
and bona fide effort to secure employment), and [3] a "policy"
test (absence of bankruptcy abuse and benefit of education).s8
The Johnson court concluded:
[A] debtor should be denied discharge of his
student loan within the five year period after the
debt matures, if either:
(a) his future financial resources are most
likely sufficient to finance repayment of the student loan, and to support the debtor and his dependents at or above the poverty level, or
(b) but for the debtor's negligence or irresponsibility he would be able to repay the loan
without lowering his standard of living below the
poverty level.
A court should grant discharge of a student
loan within five years after it becomes due, based
on a finding that repayment of the loan would
cause the debtor "undue hardship," where:
(a) The debtor's future income and wealth, in
85. 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
86. Id. at 544-45.
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the maximum foreseeable period allowed for repayment of the student loan, are likely to be insufficient to fund the loan's repayment and to
support the debtor and his dependents at a subsistence level of living, and
(b) either such hardship is due to circumstances beyond the debtor's control; or,
(c) the circumstances clearly indicate that
discharge of the student loan was not a dominant
reason for filing bankruptcy, and that the debtor's
earning prospects have not appreciably benefited
from his education.8 'l

Whichever test is applied, in the vast majority of cases, the
undue hardship discharge will be denied. As one administrator
of the student loan program noted: "In practically all cases, student loan borrowers are young, healthy, have few obligations beyond the student loan, and have a lifetime of earning ability
ahead of them. "88
III. PARTIAL DISCHARGEABILITY AND UNLIMITED
FORBEARANCE
A number of additional considerations impinge upon the
problem yet are rarely articulated in the decisions. For example,
in many situations, the student and the educational institution
are in pari delicto. The student's education did not enhance his
or her earning capacity, but there was little reason to expect
that it would. The court in Littel v. Oregon89 clearly took note of
this abuse in the administration of the student loan program
when it observed that the debtors may have been "inveigled into
obtaining the loan and taking particular courses in college when
the college authorities should have known that upon graduation
from college the student had little chance of obtaining employment in that field. "90
In Littel, both husband and wife had majored in Education
and English with the thought of becoming teachers. Both had
been unable to find teaching jobs which would utilize their col87.Id.
88. Hearings, supra note 18, at 1099 (statement of John N. Erlenborn quoting the
Director of the Virginia Loan Program).
89. 6 Bankr. Rep. 85 (D. Ore. 1980).
90. Id. at 88.
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lege educations. The husband worked as a service station attendant while his wife was employed as a CETA worker in a
half-time position as a counselor at a community college. For
these students, the promise of education was hollow. Only one of
the four theories of nondischargeability would require them to
repay the loan-the special status of the government as creditor.
The court in Littel apparently considered that theory to be sufficient. It was not persuaded that repayment was altogether impossible. Indeed, "by a reasonable additional effort, some payment could be made."91 Accordingly, the court directed each
spouse to make payments of ten dollars a month on the student
loans over a thirty-three and forty-eight month time period for a
total repayment of approximately eleven percent of the principal. 92 Thus, a theory of partial dischargeability was born.9s
In United States v. Hemmen,9" the court fashioned a more
unique formula for partial dischargeability. There the debtor
was recently divorced, living with his parents, and receiving unemployment benefits. His educational debts of approximately
$4,000 amounted to less then one-fourth of his total unsecured
debts. Although his present circumstances were modest, the
court observed that "[t]his is a temporary lack of income rather
than permanent."911 Therefore, the court was willing to supervise
its judgment for a short term of years and discharge the student
loans only if the debtor used his best efforts to find suitable employment and paid the student loan creditors all funds in excess
of $3,600 per annum for a period of five years from the date of
maturity of the last loan.96

The creative solutions employed by the courts in Littel and
Hemmen are commendable because they mesh nicely with the
existing statutory scheme for the repayment of student loans.
Under the student loan program, the lender has the option of
unlimited forbearance to assist the borrower during a period of
financial difficulty; payments may be reduced or deferred indefi91. Id.

92.Id.
93. Earlier, in Wisconsin Higher Educ. Aids Bd. v. MacPherson, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
950, 951 (W.D. Wis. 1978), the court had required the debtor to repay the principal
amount of the student loan but forgave the interest.
94. 7 Bankr. Rep. 63 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
95. Id. at 67.
96.Id.
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nitely.97 In effect, an undue hardship provision was already built
into the student loan program before the enactment of the bankruptcy exception to discharge.
In light of that second undue hardship prOVISIOn, a few
courts have found it nearly impossible for a debtor to discharge
a student loan.98 While it may be possible to show an inability to
meet the normal repayment schedule, it is inordinately difficult
to demonstrate an inability to pay even a nominal amount until
circumstances improve. Most courts, however, have simply ignored the possibility of unlimited forbearance. 99 Both views
render one of the undue hardship provisions devoid of meaning.
It would seem that an accomodation of the dual statutory
scheme could best be served through a rule of partial dischirrgeability, requiring whatever repayment is feasible under
the circumstances during the five year period following the maturity of the student loan.
IV. DISCHARGE OF STUDENT LOANS THROUGH
CHAPTER 13 OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM
ACTloO
Perhaps the greatest paradox in the dischargeability of student loans is revealed in a contrast between the provisions of
Chapter 7, straight bankruptcy, and Chapter 13, the repayment
plan. Chapter 13 contains a super discharge provision-section
1328(a). While a number of debts such as student loans, traffic
tickets,lOl and debts procured by fraud lo2 are nondischargeable
in straight bankruptcy, all debts except taxes and family support obligations are dischargeable in Chapter 13. The intent of
Congress in providing for greater dischargeability under Chapter
13 than Chapter 7 was apparently to encourage debtors to attempt a repayment plan. los But, once again, the legislative intent has been distorted by judicial interpretation.
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1080(c) (1976).

98. See, e.g., Warren v. University of Dlinois, 6 Bankr. Rep. 233 (S.D. Fla. 1980) and
Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Densmore, 8 Bankr. Rep. 308 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
99. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
532, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
100. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. II 1978).
101. Id. § 523(a)(7).
102. Id. § 523(a)(2).
103. See, e.g., In re Seman, 4 Bankr. Rep. 568, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Under Chapter 13, a debtor's repayment plan need not provide for payment of all debts in full; unsecured creditors must
simply receive more than they would in straight bankruptcy proceedings. lo• In many consumer bankruptcies, all of the debtor's
assets are exempt; unsecured creditors receive nothing. As a result, a number of courts have applied the statutory test quite
literally and have approved Chapter 13 repayment plans calling
for nominal payments to unsecured creditors. lo5
Thus, while student loans may be generally nondischargeable in straight bankruptcy, in a number of jurisdictions they
are freely dischargeable in Chapter 13 proceedings, regardless 9f
hardship. The disparity in treatment between the student Joan
debtor who files under Chapter 7 and the student loan debtor
who files under Chapter 13 renders the legislature's and the
court's rather stringent view of the undue hardship discharge-on whatever theory-remarkably anomolous.
CONCLUSION
It is readily apparent that the courts are in hopeless disarray with respect to the dischargeability of student loans in bankruptcy. Their confusion is a function of the apparent dichotomy
between the focus of the legislative history on bEplkruptcy abuse
and Congress' articulated grounds for discharge, "undue hardship." Until the legislative compromise that led to the introduction of the undue hardship exception, Congress' intent to deny
discharge to those engaged in bankruptcy abuse was manifest.
Deeming it impractical for the courts to independently ascertain
the requisite fraud under section 523(a)(2) in each case, such.
fraud was to be conclusively presumed if a bankruptcy were filed
within five years of graduation. Yet the factual basis for such a
wholesale presumption of fraud was nonexistent. Rather than
abandoning that premise altogether, Congress reached "an unhappy compromise with the undue hardship exception. It chose
inappropriate language and then failed to furnish clear guide104. 11 u.s.c. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IT 1978).
105. Compare United States v. Eichelberger, 6 Bankr. Rep. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1980)
with In re Yee, 7 Bankr. Rep. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The immediate dividend to the creditor may well be greater in a repayment plan than in straight bankruptcy proceedings.
But the Chapter 7 student loan creditor is free to pursue its claim to repayment in full
after bankruptcy because its debt is nondischargeable. The Chapter 13 student loan
creditor is barred from further collection effort because its debt is discharged.
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lines for judicial application.
Not surprisingly, the absence of a single coherent theory for
the discharge of student loans has led to a variety of judicial
interpretations. Until the statutory language is clarified to more
accurately reflect the legislative intent, student loan debtors will
continue to be dependent on the unlimited, and generally unreviewable/ o6 discretion of individual bankruptcy judges.
The medley of concerns expressed in the legislative history
suggest a number of possible revisions:
[1] If the legislative concern is truly bankruptcy abuse, reliance might be placed on section 523(a)(2). However,
given the difficulty of establishing fraudulent intent at
the time the loan is made, a conclusive presumption of
abuse should arise if bankruptcy is filed within a given
period of time and student loans comprise a given percentage of total indebtedness. In addition, either the
super discharge provision of Chapter 13 should be
amended to conform to this intent, or Chapter 13
should be revised to require a repayment plan premised
on the debtor's best efforts.107
[2] If the legislative concern is the inequity inherent in the
debtor retaining a valuable asset-education-without
paying for it, student loans should be nondischargeable
unless the debtor, after bona fide effort, is unable to secure employment in a field related to his or her education. Again, either the super discharge provision of
Chapter 13 should be amended to conform to this intent, or Chapter 13 should be revised to require a repayment plan premised on the debtor's best efforts.
[3] If the legislative concern is the high moral claim of the
government as a creditor and the maintenance of an
ongoing program of educational assistance, student
loans should be nondischargeable altogether. Again, either the super discharge provision of Chapter 13 should
106. Findings of fact cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. FED. R. CIV. P.
52(a).
107. A good faith effort was required of the Chapter 13 debtor by the technical
amendments bill, S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 191(a) (1979).
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be amended to conform to this intent, or Chapter 13
should be revised to require a repayment plan premised
on the debtor's best efforts.
[4] If the legislative concern is in fact true hardship, student loans should be nondischargeable in the absence of
unforeseen circumstances that will not be alleviated by
the discharge of other debts. Despite the student loan
creditor's option of unlimited forbearance in the event
of hardship, a separate provision in the bankruptcy act
to facilitate a fresh start for the debtor would be desirable. In addition, the possibility of a middle ground,
partial dischargeability, should be clearly set forth in
the legislation. Again, either the super discharge provision of Chapter 13 should be amended to conform to
this intent, or Chapter 13 should be revised to require a
repayment plan premised on the debtor's best efforts.
A survey of the case law indicates that the majority of
courts purport to apply the fourth standard-the present statutory standard-albeit somewhat harshly. The tenor of the opinions and the overwhelming result, nondischargeability, belie that
theory. In fact, the third standard generally prevails. Bankruptcy judges have been swayed by an opinion shared by lenders, a number of members of Congress, and the public at large:
bankruptcy is inherently unfair to unsecured creditors. In the
end, the controversy surrounding student loans in bankruptcy
may be characterized by one dominant theme: hostility to the
basic premise of bankruptcy-forgiveness of debt.
Depicting the legislative and judicial approaches as retaliatory or vindictive is, perhaps, overly harsh. It is necessary to
separate the result-nondischargeability-from the rhetoric and
the theory. The result is sound for it comports with a fundamental governmental interest-the maintenance of ongoing assistance to students of higher education. The purpose of the federal student loan program is twofold: [1] ensuring a sufficient
supply of well trained, competent professional and technical personnel, and [2] allowing every person the fullest possible educational opportunity by making loans available to those who would
not otherwise obtain a loan because of their age, lack of collat-
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eral, or borrowing history.l08 These are worthy objectives that
are clearly subverted by the discharge of student loans in bankruptcy. Even though the statistics do not indicate that bankruptcy filings were ever a great problem in terms of absolute dollars, they clearly remain a problem in a political sense. As the
legislative history indicates, even an ill-perceived abuse may be
as significant as actual abuse in terms of its impact on congressional willingness to fund a student loan program. In sum, Congress did not go far enough in its treatment of student loans in
bankruptcy. Student loans should be nondischargeable altogether-regardless of hardship and the period of time elapsed. l09
The debtor is already adequately protected from the spectre of
debtor's prison or involuntary servitude through a program of
forbearance built into the administration of the student loan
program. The interests of future generations of students demand
that their predecessors' promises be kept.

108. S. REP. No. 673, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36, reprintea in [1965] U.S. CODE
CONGo & An. NEWS 4027, 4053.
109. Because student loans are repaid over a ten year period, a student now may
discharge one-half of the obligation at the end of five years.
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